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KP PERMANENT MAKE-UP V. LASTING 
IMPRESSION—THE STATUTORY DEFENSE OF 
FAIR USE IS AVAILABLE IN TRADEMARK 
INFRINGEMENT CASES WITHOUT 
NEGATING THE LIKELIHOOD OF CONSUMER 
CONFUSION, ACCORDING TO THE SUPREME 
COURT 
Sue Ann Mota* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue of 
trademark law numerous times in the last two decades,1 most recently 
on December 8, 2004, in KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression 
I, Inc.2  In KP Permanent, the Court unanimously held that a party in a 
trademark infringement suit raising the statutory defense of fair use does 
not have the burden of negating the likelihood that consumers will be 
confused by their fair uses of a mark,3 reversing the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit on this issue.4 
This Article briefly reviews the Lanham Act5 and its affirmative 
defenses, including the fair use defense at issue in KP Permanent.6  This 
Article examines the Supreme Court’s decision in KP Permanent in light 
of recent trademark decisions.  Then, this Article concludes with 
implications of this decision and recommendations for companies 
selecting and using trademarks. 
                                                 
*  Professor of Legal Studies, Bowling Green State University; J.D., University of Toledo 
College of Law, Order of the Coif; M.A. and B.A., Bowling Green State University. 
1 See infra notes 35-66 and accompanying text. 
2 125 S. Ct. 542 (2004); see infra notes 67-98 and accompanying text. 
3 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc., 125 S. Ct. at 545-46. 
4 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 328 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 
2003), vacated by 125 S. Ct. 542 (2004); see infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text. 
5 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000). 
6 See supra note 2. 
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II.  LANHAM ACT AND DEFENSES 
While Congress’s right to enact copyright and patent law is pursuant 
to power granted by the U.S. Constitution’s Copyright Clause,7 Congress 
enacts trademark law pursuant to the Commerce Clause.8  Consequently, 
there are some basic differences between types of federally protected 
intellectual property, including the fact that copyright and patent laws 
preempt state laws under the intellectual property clause,9 while states 
may protect trademarks in addition to federal protection. 
Congress enacted the Trademark Act of 1976, the Lanham Act,10 to 
establish federal uniform protection for marks used in interstate and 
foreign commerce.11  Congress considered this important improvement 
over a “disorderly patchwork”12 of federal trademark laws for several 
years before enacting the Lanham Act.13  A trademark is defined under 
the Lanham Act as a word, name, symbol, device, or combination of the 
three, used or intended to be used in commerce to identify or distinguish 
one’s goods from those manufactured or sold by others.14  The Lanham 
Act was passed to protect against deceptive and misleading use of marks 
in commerce, to protect registered marks used in commerce from 
interference, to prevent fraud and deception in commerce by copies or 
counterfeits, and to provide rights and remedies stipulated by trademark 
treaties and conventions.15 
                                                 
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have power . . . to promote the 
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors 
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”). 
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have the power . . . to regulate 
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and the Indian tribes.”).  
Congress initially attempted in 1870 to enact a registration system to protect marketing 
symbols under the copyright clause.  See supra note 7.  The Supreme Court struck this 
registration system down in 1881 in the Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).  Congress then 
enacted a new trademark law under the Commerce Clause powers.  Act of March 3, 1881, 
ch. 138, 21 Stat 502 (1881). 
9 See supra note 7. 
10 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051–1127 (West 1997 & 1998 & Supp. 2004). 
11 H.R. REP. NO. 76-944, at 4 (1939), quoted in Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Pet’r at 2, KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 
542 (2004) (No. 03-409), available at LEXIS 2003 U.S. Briefs 409. 
12 Id. 
13 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051–1127 (West 1997 & 1998 & Supp. 2004). 
14 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 1998 & Supp. 2004).  Service marks are also protected.  Id. 
15 Id. 
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The Lanham Act provides owners of both registered16 and 
unregistered17marks a federal cause of action for monetary and 
injunctive relief.  A mark registered on the principal register, however, is 
“prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark, and of the 
registration of the mark, of the registrant’s ownership of the mark, and of 
the registrant’s exclusive right to use the mark in commerce.”18  Five 
consecutive years of use of a mark after registration renders the mark 
incontestable,19 which is conclusive evidence of the validity of the 
mark.20 
Despite the incontestability of a mark, a party may defend against a 
claim of trademark infringement by successfully proving a statutory 
affirmative defense.  These statutory defenses include the following:  the 
registration or incontestable use of the mark was obtained fraudulently,21  
the mark was abandoned,22 the registered mark is being used by the 
registrant so as to misrepresent the source of the goods or services,23 the 
name or mark being called an infringement is a use of an individual’s 
name in the individual’s own business,24 or the name or mark being 
called an infringement is descriptive and used fairly and in good faith 
only to describe the goods or services for a party25 (the so called fair use 
defense at issue in KP Permanent),26 the mark was adopted without 
knowledge of the registrant’s prior use and has been used continuously 
since that time,27 the mark was registered and used prior to the Lanham 
Act (but this defense applies only in the area of the prior use),28 the mark 
has been or is being used to violate U.S. antitrust laws,29 the mark is 
functional (or generic),30 or equitable principles such as laches, estoppel, 
or acquiescence apply.31 
                                                 
16 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2000). 
17 Id. § 1125(a). 
18 Id. § 1115(a). 
19 Id. § 1065. 
20 Id. § 1115(b). 
21 Id. § 1115(b)(1). 
22 Id. § 1115(b)(2). 
23 Id. § 1115(b)(3). 
24 Id. § 1115(b)(4). 
25 Id. 
26 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 542 (2004); see 
infra notes 67-98 and accompanying text. 
27 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5) (2000). 
28 Id.  § 1115(b)(6). 
29 Id.  § 1115(b)(7). 
30 Id.  § 1115(b)(8). 
31 Id.  § 1115(b)(9). 
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A registrant of a mark may bring a civil suit against a person who 
uses in commerce any reproduction or copy of a registered mark in 
connection with the sale or advertising of any goods or services if the use 
of the mark is likely to cause confusion, likely to cause mistake, or likely 
to deceive,32 if the person does not have a statutory affirmative defense.33  
An injunction is available as a remedy, even against an innocent 
infringer;34 monetary damages are available to the registrant if the use of 
the mark is done with knowledge that the imitation is intended to cause 
confusion, intended to cause mistake, or intended to deceive.35 
III.  SUPREME COURT TRADEMARK DECISIONS 
The United States Supreme Court has decided numerous trademark 
cases in the last two decades.  In 1985, the Court in Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. 
Dollar Park and Fly, Inc.36 held that a holder of a registered mark can rely 
on the fact that the mark is incontestable even though the mark is only 
descriptive and simply describes37 the product or its characteristics.38  
With only Justice Stevens dissenting,39 the Court reversed the Ninth 
Circuit, which held that the defendant could defend against the 
infringement by showing that the mark was only descriptive.40  The 
Supreme Court, however, stated:  “One searches the language of the 
Lanham Act in vain to find any support for the offensive/defensive 
distinction applied by the Court of Appeals.  The statute nowhere 
distinguishes between a registrant’s offensive and defensive use of  an 
incontestable mark.”41  Thus, two decades ago, the Court reversed the 
Ninth Circuit and refused to go beyond the Lanham Act to make 
incontestable yet descriptive marks contestable. 
                                                 
32 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117(a) (West 1998 & Supp. 2004). 
33 See supra notes 21-31 and accompanying text. 
34 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2) (2000). 
35 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117(b) (West 1998 & Supp. 2004). 
36 469 U.S. 189 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Timothy R. M. Bryant, Comment, 
Trademark Infringement:  The Irrelevance of Evidence of Copying to Secondary Meaning, 83 NW. 
U. L. REV. 473 (1988-89); Jay Dratler, Jr., Trademark Protection for Industrial Designs, 1988 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 887 (1988). 
37 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1982); see supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
38 Park ‘N Fly, 469 U.S. at 191. 
39 Id. at 206. 
40 Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, 718 F.2d 327, 331 (9th Cir. 1983). 
41 Park ‘N Fly, 469 U.S. at 196. 
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In 1992, the Court in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.42 held 
unanimously that unregistered trade dress, or the total image and 
appearance of a business, is protected under the Lanham Act.43  The 
holding is based on a finding of inherent distinctiveness, even without 
proof that the trade dress has acquired secondary meaning,44 or that a 
mark or dress has come through use to be uniquely associated with a 
specific source.45  Again, the Court found that to hold otherwise would 
go beyond the text of the Lanham Act and undermine that statute.46 
In 1995, in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.,47 the Court 
unanimously held that the “Lanham Act permits the registration of a 
trademark that consists, purely and simply, of a color.”48  Once again, the 
Ninth Circuit was reversed.49  According to the Court, “[b]oth the 
language of the Act and the basic underlying principles of trademark 
law would seem to include color within the universe of things that can 
qualify as a trademark.”50  In this case, the Court refused to judicially 
narrow the Lanham Act. 
In 2000, revisiting the issue of unregistered trade dress, the Supreme 
Court unanimously held in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc.51 
that a product’s design, its trade dress, was distinctive and protectible 
only upon a showing that the design had developed secondary meaning, 
which occured when the design had, in the minds of the public, the 
primary significance of identifying the source of the product rather than 
the product itself.52  The Court distinguished Two Pesos, stating that the 
trade dress in question there was product packaging,53 versus the trade 
                                                 
42 505 U.S. 763 (1992); see C. Andrew Wattleworth, Comment, Inherently Distinctive 
Product Configurations Under 43 of the Lanham Act:  Where Do We Stand in the Aftermath of 
Two Pesos?, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 1071 (1995-96). 
43 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
44 Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 764. 
45 Id. at 766 n.4.  The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was affirmed.  See Taco 
Cabana Int’l v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1991), aff’d, 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
46 Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 774. 
47 514 U.S. 159 (1995). 
48 Id. at 160; see Kristi L. Davidson, Note, The Supreme Court Says Yes to Color, Pure and 
Simple:  Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products  Co., 21 DAYTON L. REV. 885 (1996). 
49 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 13 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1994). 
50 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162.  Trademark is defined broadly under the Lanham Act.  Id.; see 
supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
51 529 U.S. 205 (2000). 
52 Id. at 215; see Christina Platt Hillson, Trade Dress Protection:  When a Dress Is Just a Dress 
According to the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, 53 BAYLOR L. 
REV. 461 (2001). 
53 See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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dress in question in Samara involving product design, which does 
require a secondary meaning.54  While courts now have the difficult job 
of drawing the line between product packaging and product design 
trade dress, when in doubt, courts should err on the side of caution and 
classify ambiguous trade dress as product design, which may require a 
secondary meaning.55 
The Supreme Court has recently decided two cases where trademark 
protection was not granted when other forms of intellectual property 
had expired.  In TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.,56 the 
Court unanimously held that when utility patents expire on a 
mechanism to keep road signs upright, trade dress protection under the 
Lanham Act is unavailable when a design is merely functional or when 
product features are functional.57 
In 2003, the Supreme Court in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox 
Film Corp.58 held unanimously, with Justice Breyer not participating, that 
the former holder of a copyright on a television series now in the public 
domain could not prevail under the Lanham Act against the producer of 
an adopted video version of the series.59  The Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit was reversed.60 
In 2003, the Supreme Court also unanimously held in Moseley v. V 
Secret Catalogue, Inc.61 that the Federal Trademark Dilution Act 
(“FTDA”)62 requires an actual proof of dilution of a famous mark, not 
                                                 
54 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
55 Samara, 529 U.S. at 214-15.  The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was reversed.  
See Samara Bros. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 165 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 1998), rev’d, 529 U.S. 205 
(2000). 
56 523 U.S. 23 (2001). 
57 Id. at  34-35 (2001); see Eric Berger, Note, TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, 
Inc.:  Intellectual Property in Crisis:  Rubbernecking the Aftermath of the United States Supreme 
Court’s TrafFix Wreck, 57 ARK. L. REV. 383 (2004).  The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
was reversed.  Marketing Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 200 F. 3d 929 (6th Cir. 
1999), rev’d, 523 U.S. 23, 35 (2001). 
58 539 U.S. 23 (2003). 
59 Id.  Fox’s copyright on the television series was not renewed and thus expired in 1977.  
Id. at 26; see Sue Mota, Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox—One Can’t Get Back by Trademark 
What One Gave Up Under Copyright, 1 OKLA J. L. & TECH. 7 (2003). 
60 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Entertaining Distributing, 34 Fed. Appx. 312 (9th 
Cir. 2002), rev’d 539 U.S. 23 (2003). 
61 537 U.S. 418 (2003). 
62 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4). 
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just a likelihood of dilution.63  Under the 2004 FTDA, dilution is defined 
as “the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and 
distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of 
competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or 
likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.”64  In its first FTDA 
decision, the Court alluded to the FTDA’s requirement of actual 
dilution.65  Thus, the stage was set for the Supreme Court’s December, 
2004 decision in KP Permanent.66 
IV.  KP PERMANENT  
KP Permanent Make-Up (“KP”) and Lasting Impression (“Lasting”) 
are direct competitors in the permanent makeup industry.67  Permanent 
makeup, also called micropigmentation, has both medical and cosmetic 
uses.68  Permanent makeup is used by injecting pigment into the skin, 
similar to a tattoo, by trained professionals, who are the purchasers of  
this product.69 
KP has used “micro color” on flyers beginning in 1990, and on 
pigment bottles since 1991.70  On the bottles, the term “MICRO COLOR” 
is followed by the color of the pigment.71  Lasting began using “micro 
colors” as a trademark in 1992, and the mark was registered on the 
Principal Register at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office in 1993.72  
Lasting’s mark became incontestable.73 
In 1999, KP began using the term “micro color” in a ten-page 
marketing brochure; both the terms “pigment” and “chart” appear in 
                                                 
63 Moseley, 537 U.S. at 418; see Sue Mota, Victor’s Little Secret Prevails (For Now) over 
Victoria’s Secret:  The Supreme Court Requires Proof of Actual Dilution Under the FTDA, 19 
SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH L.J. 541 (2003). 
64 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 1998 & Supp. 2004). 
65 Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433. 
66 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 542 (2004); see 
infra notes 67-98 and accompanying text. 
67 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 328 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th 
Cir. 2003), vacated by 125 S. Ct. 542 (2004). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 1066. 
72 Registration Number 1769592, a design plus words, letters and or numbers, available 
through the Trademark Electronic Search System (TESS) available at http://tess2.uspto. gov 
(Mar. 19, 2005). 
73 KP Permanent, 328 F.3d at 1065. 
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smaller font than “micro color.”74  Lasting sent KP a cease and desist 
letter demanding that KP stop using the term “micro color.”75  In 2000, 
KP brought this trademark declaratory relief action against Lasting.76  
Lasting answered and counterclaimed for trademark infringement, 
unfair competition, and false advertising under California’s Business and 
Professional Code.77  The district court granted KP’s motion for 
summary judgment and denied Lasting’s motion for summary 
adjudication, thus allowing KP to continue to use “micro color” as it had 
since 1991, and allowing Lasting to continue to use its registered mark.78  
According to the district court, “micro color” is generic, or if not generic, 
descriptive.79  Neither party had acquired a secondary meaning to 
“micro color.”80  Finally, KP’s use was fair under the statutory defense,81 
and the district court declined to discuss likelihood of confusion.82 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, 
ruling that the district court erred in not needing to make a 
determination on likelihood of confusion.83  Likelihood of confusion 
exists when consumers viewing the mark would probably assume that 
the goods are associated with a source of a different product.84  Because 
                                                 
74 Id. at 1066. 
75 Br. for Pet’r at 2, KP Permanent, 125 S. Ct. 542 (2004) (No. 03-409), available at LEXIS 
2003 U.S. Briefs 409. 
76 The action was brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000).  KP requested that 
Lasting’s trademark be cancelled as the term “micro color” is generic.  Compl., KP 
Permanent (2000), found in J. A. at 38-43, KP Permanent, 125 S. Ct. 542 (2004) (No. 03-409), 
available at LEXIS 2003 U.S. Briefs 409.  To support KP’s claim, KP submitted fourteen 
declarations from its customers concerning KP’s continuous prior use.  Br. for Pet’r at 2, KP 
Permanent, 125 S. Ct. 542 (2004) (No. 03-409), available at LEXIS 2003 U.S. Briefs 409. 
77 Answer and Countercl. at 1st App. 26-28, found in J.A. at 54-57, KP Permanent, 125 S. 
Ct. 542 (2004) (No. 03-409), available at LEXIS 2003 U.S. Briefs 409. 
78 KP Permanent, 328 F.3d at 1066. 
79 Id. 
80 Id.  Although more than twenty other companies sell permanent make-up, no other 
competitors uses the term “micro color.”  Brief for Respondents at 4, KP Permanent, 125 S. 
Ct. 542 (2004) (No. 03-409), available at LEXIS 2003 U.S. Briefs 409. 
81 KP Permanent, 328 F.3d at 1066; see supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
82 KP Permanent, 328 F.3d at 1066. 
83 Id. at 1072. 
84 Id.  The Ninth Circuit looks at eight factors in determining likelihood of confusion:  
“(1) the strength of the mark; (2) proximity or relatedness of the goods; (3) the similarity of 
the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) the marketing channels used; (6) the degree 
of care customers are likely to exercise in purchasing the goods; (7) the defendant’s intent 
in selecting the mark; and (8) the likelihood of expansion into other markets.”  Id. at 1073. 
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the appeals court found genuine issues of material fact, the issue of 
likelihood of confusion, it reversed the district court.85 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide 
whether a party raising a statutory affirmative defense of fair use86 to a 
claim of trademark infringement has the burden of negating the 
likelihood of confusion by consumers over the origin of goods and 
services.87  The United States Supreme Court in December, 2004, 
unanimously held that the party does not have that burden, reversing 
the Ninth Circuit.88 
The Supreme Court started its analysis with the text of the Lanham 
Act, which places the burden of proving likelihood of confusion on the 
party claiming infringement,89 while saying nothing about the need to 
prove absence of likelihood of confusion under the fair use defense.90  
The Court concluded that it is not plausible that Congress would state 
that a mark holder has to show likelihood of confusion but would utilize 
the term “used fairly” in the statutory defense to place the defendant 
                                                 
85 Id.; see Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 
827 (2004); William G. Barber, Recent Developments in Trademark Law:  Reverse Domain 
Hijacking, Mutant Copyrights, and Other Mysterious Creatures of the Trademark World, 12 TEX. 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 361 (2004); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Trademark Jurisprudence of the 
Rehnquist Court, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 187 (2004); Intellectual Property 
Symposium, The Supreme Court and Trademark Law in the New Millennium, 30 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 1651 (2004). 
86 See supra notes 21-31 and accompanying text. 
87 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression, Inc., 540 U.S. 1099 (2004).  The 
Court granted certiorari to resolve a split in the circuits on this issue.  KP Permanent Make-
Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 542, 545 (2004).  The Fifth and Sixth Circuits 
ruled similarly to the Ninth Circuit.  PACCAR, Inc. v. TeleScan Technologies, LLC, 319 F. 
3d 243 (6th Cir. 2003); Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, 698 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 
1983).  The Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits held otherwise, that a likelihood of 
confusion does not preclude the use of the fair use defense.  Cosmetically Sealed Industries, 
Inc. v. Chesbrough-Pond’s USA Co., 125 F.3d 28 (2d Cir. 1997); Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar 
Corp. of Am., 110 F.3d 234 (4th Cir. 1997); Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 
69 F.3d 1055 (7th Cir. 1995).  Citing this split in the circuits, the petitioner asserted that the 
law should be uniform on both coasts.  Reply B. on petition for Writ of Cert. at 1, KP 
Permanent, 328 F.3d at 1061 (9th Cir. 2003) (No. 03-409), LEXIS 2003 U.S. Briefs 409.  To let 
the split go unresolved would, according to the petitioner, encourage foreign shopping, 
complicate business planning, undermine certainty of expectations, and lessen confidence 
in the federal judiciary.  Reply B. on petition for Writ of Cert. at 4, KP Permanent, 328 F.3d at 
1061 (9th Cir. 2003) (No. 03-409). 
88 KP Permanent, 125 S. Ct. at 542.  The Supreme Court thus agreed more with the rulings 
of the Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits.  See supra note 87. 
89 KP Permanent, 125 S. Ct. at 542; see 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (2000). 
90 KP Permanent, 125 S. Ct. at 543; see 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4). 
Mota: KP Permanent Make-Up v. Lasting Impression?The Statutory Defense
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2004
336 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
 
under a burden to negate likelihood of confusion.91  The Court also did 
not agree with Lasting’s suggestion that the term “used fairly” in the 
defense92 refers to the likelihood of confusion test under the common law 
of unfair competition.93  The Court finally calls the requirement that the 
defendant independently show a lack of confusion “incoherence.”94 
The Supreme Court thus held that under the statutory defense that a 
mark is used fairly and in good faith, there is no burden to negate a 
likelihood of confusion.95  The Court also recognized, however, that 
some possibility of consumer confusion must be compatible with fair 
use; the Lanham Act was not meant to deprive commercial speakers of 
the ordinary use of descriptive words.96  The Court would not go further 
in its decision, though, beyond the Ninth Circuit’s consideration of the 
subject, 97 but it did note that on remand the court should direct its 
attention to factual issues bearing on the fair use defense.98 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Congress placed a fair use defense to trademark infringement in the 
Lanham Act,99 along with other defenses.  This defense is in line with the 
subsequent Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
Agreement (“TRIPS Agreement”) part of the agreement establishing the 
World Trade Organization (“WTO”).100  The TRIPS Agreement provides 
that any sign, or combination of signs capable of distinguishing goods 
and services from those of others is eligible for trademark protection.101  
Member countries may also provide limited exceptions, such as fair use 
of descriptive terms.102  The United States Supreme Court held that the 
fair use defense, in KP Permanent is a stand-alone defense under the 
Lanham Act, and it does not require the defendant to also prove the non-
                                                 
91 KP Permanent, 125 S. Ct. at 542-43.  Justice Scalia did not concur only in footnotes 4 
and 5, discussing the legislative history.  Id. at 542-43 nn.4-5. 
92 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
93 KP Permanent, 125 S. Ct. at 544. 
94 Id. at 545. 
95 Id. at 553. 
96 Id. at 549. 
97 Id. at 551. 
98 Id. at 553 n.6.  Justice Breyer did not concur with this vote.  Id. at 553. 
99 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
100 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 2004, 
WTO Agreement, Annex 1C; see Sue Mota, TRIPS:  Five Years of Disputes at the WTO, 17 
ARIZ. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 533 (2000). 
101 WTO Agreement Annex 1C, art. 15.1.  Service marks are also protectable.  Id. at art. 
16.2. 
102 Id. at art. 17. 
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statutory absence of likelihood of confusion.103  This decision is the 
correct interpretation of the Lanham Act, which is in accord with the 
subsequent WTO TRIPS Agreement, which also has no such additional 
statutory requirement. 
The Supreme Court’s decision, which reversed the decision of the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,104 is not surprising.  In the past 
two decades, the Court has held to the text of the trademark statute three 
times, in Park ‘N Fly, Inc.,105 Qualitex,106 and Mosely.107  The Court has also 
reversed the Ninth Circuit in trademark cases four times in the last two 
decades in Park ‘N Fly108 in 1985, Qualitex109 in 1995, Dastar110 in 2003, and 
thus not surprisingly, in 2004 in KP Permanent.111 
In addition, the Supreme Court’s decision in KP Permanent is the 
correct decision because it draws a careful line not to chill commercial 
speech.  Businesses may continue in good faith to use fairly a descriptive 
mark, as per the Lanham Act’s defense.112  Selectors of marks should be 
thus warned that if a descriptive mark is selected, there is a risk that the 
mark may be fairly used in good faith by others.  Courts need to decide 
on a case-by-case basis if the mark is descriptive and if the use is fair and 
in good faith, as the Court noted to the lower courts on remand in KP 
Permanent.113  This decision by the Court draws a fair balance between 
protecting legitimate trademark rights and commercial free speech. 
                                                 
103 KP Permanent, 125 S. Ct. 542; see supra notes 67-98 and accompanying text. 
104 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 328 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 
2003), vacated by 125 S. Ct. 542 (2004); see supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text. 
105 See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text. 
106 See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text. 
107 See supra notes 57-66 and accompanying text. 
108 See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text. 
109 See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text. 
110 See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text. 
111 See supra notes 86-98 and accompanying text. 
112 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
113 See supra note  98 and accompanying text. 
Mota: KP Permanent Make-Up v. Lasting Impression?The Statutory Defense
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2004
